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Abstract In this paper, I examine the comparatively neglected intuition of
production regarding causality. I begin by examining the weaknesses of current
production accounts of causality. I then distinguish between giving a good
production account of causality, and a good account of production. I argue that
an account of production is needed to make sense of vital practices in causal
inference. Finally, I offer an information-transmission account of production
based on John Collier’s work, that solves the primary weaknesses of current
production accounts: applicability and absences.
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1 Introduction
Ned Hall argues that ‘Causation, understood as a relation between events, comes
in at least two basic and fundamentally different varieties.’ [Hall, 2004, p225.]
These are:
• Dependence: about dependency of E on C.
• Production: about link, biff, oomph between C and E.
To illustrate, consider Wesley Salmon’s technological example: ‘when I arrive
at home in the evening, I press a button on my electronic door opener (cause)
to open the garage door (effect). First, there is an interaction between my
finger and the control device, then an electromagnetic signal transmits a causal
influence from the control device to the mechanism that raises the garage door,
and finally there is an interaction between the signal and that mechanism.’
[Salmon, 1998a, pp17-8.]
Here, Salmon traces the link between C and E, and this is the production
sense in which pressing the button causes the garage door to rise. There is also
a dependency between the garage door rising and the button pressing. Perhaps
if the button had not been pressed, the garage door would not have risen; or
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pressing the button increased the probability of the garage door rising. This
is Hall’s dependence. Hall argues that there is no hope for a univocal account
of causality, because production and dependence each do different jobs. He
writes: ‘Counterfactual dependence is causation in one sense: But in that sense
of “cause”, Transitivity, Locality and Intrinsicness are all false. Still, they are
not false simpliciter; for there is a different concept of causation - the one I
call “production” - that renders them true.’ [Hall, 2004, p253.] It will be a
major aim of this paper to examine these different jobs, particularly the job of
production.
It has been recognized that persistent counterexamples to dependence, or
what I will often call difference-making, come from production intuitions, and
vice versa. To see the problem for dependence or difference-making, suppose
Billy and Suzy are throwing stones at a bottle. Billy’s stone hits the bottle,
shattering it, while an instant later Suzy’s stone whistles through the space and
flying shards of glass left behind. Suzy’s backup stone removes the dependence
of the bottle shattering on Billy’s throw. Suzy’s stone would have shattered
the bottle if Billy’s had not been present. But since we can trace the link
between Billy’s throw and the shattering, we unambigously identify Billy’s throw
as the cause. To see the problem for production, suppose Billy and Suzy are
pilots in a bombing raid on an enemy city. Suzy flies the bomber to the city
and drops the bombs. But Billy is her escort fighter, successfully shooting
down all the enemy fighters that attempt to destroy Suzy’s plane. There is
no continuous link between Billy’s actions and the bombing, as there is with
Suzy’s actions. Nevertheless, the bombing depends on Billy’s actions, rendering
him a cause. This suggests what Hall argues: that dependence and production
answer to conflicting intuitions regarding causality, rendering a univocal account
impossible. This argument has been a powerful motivation for pluralism about
causality.
Accounts in terms of dependence or difference-making are clearly in the
ascendancy. Consider the literature:
• Difference-making: Regularity; probabilistic; counterfactual; invari-
ance; causal modelling.
• Production: Reichenbach-Salmon mark transmission; Salmon-Dowe’s
conserved quantities theory; some Anscombeian pluralist primitivists, that
may include Cartwright, and Machamer, Darden and Craver; Glennan’s
mechanistic theory.1
The majority of work is still on difference-making accounts, with the literature
on each type of difference-making account being vast. Correspondingly, the
literature on production is a drop in a counterfactual ocean. Further, existing
production accounts have recognized weaknesses, and few seem inclined to try
to fix them.
1I will expand on all these theories later, in section 2. There are also some less well known
accounts that classify as production accounts, such as the brief account of Hall [2004]. I will
set these aside here.
2
In this paper, I will examine the weaknesses of existing production accounts
of causality in section 2. I will consider what an account of production might be
for - what the job of production is - and so the continued (or not) usefulness of
some intuitions regarding production, in section 3. In section 4, I will use John
Collier’s work to argue that an account of production in terms of information
has some tempting features in terms of applicability, and argue that it offers a
novel solution to the problem of absences (in section 5). The account it offers is
particularly appropriate to causality in the domain of technology because tech-
nology often succeeds by mixing forms of information-transmission, particularly
with the integration of the human agent with the technology - the extension of
the human agent.
My aim here is to develop an information-transmission account of produc-
tion. This account is of interest both to those interested in a univocal account of
causality in terms of production, and to pluralists interested only in an account
of production. I am not directly addressing the debate between pluralism and
monism concerning causality. My own view is currently undecided. This is be-
cause I think we cannot complete our understanding of the distinction between
difference-making and production until we understand production as well as we
understand difference-making. And no good applicable account of production so
far exists. So examination of the pluralism-monism issue must wait until after
the project of this paper. Nonetheless, the project of this paper will further the
pluralism-monism debate, by rigorously examining the comparatively neglected
production intuition.
2 Current production accounts of causality
In this section I will discuss prominent production accounts of causality in turn,
and their known weaknesses, to assess the current problem for such an approach
to causality.
Salmon’s earliest process theory, inspired by Reichenbach, says that a causal
process is one that can transmit marks. (Salmon [1980], Salmon [1984], Salmon
[1997], Salmon [1998b].) Salmon eventually rejected this theory on the grounds
that it involves counterfactuals: causal processes are not those that actually
transmit marks, but are defined in terms of what would happen if a mark were
to be introduced. He moved to the account in terms of conserved quantities
developed by Dowe.
For Salmon and Dowe, a process is causal if it transmits a conserved quan-
tity, such as energy-mass, charge, or momentum. An interaction between two
processes is causal if they exchange a conserved quantity. (Dowe [1992], Dowe
[1993], Dowe [1996], Dowe [1999], Dowe [2000b], Dowe [2000a].) This is probably
still the best-known production account of causality, in spite of four well-known
problems with it.
First, if causal claims are contextual, then whether C causes E can alter
with alterations in context. For example, whether a particular ceremony causes
a legal marriage depends on the laws of that country - which presumably don’t
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alter whether conserved quantities are transmitted between C and E.
Secondly, we think that causes are effective in virtue of some but not all of
their properties - the relevant ones. The movement of one billiard ball causes
the movement of the next in virtue of properties such as its momentum, but
not properties such as its colour. But the conserved quantity theory doesn’t
discriminate among properties. It tells us only that there is a genuine causal
process here, but doesn’t give us the resources to discriminate among genuine
causal processes.
Third, the only properties the conserved quantity theory could possibly pick
out as relevant are conserved quantities. These are relatively few, such as charge,
mass, momentum and so on. But in the vast majority of cases of causality in the
special sciences, these are not the relevant properties at all. The vast majority
of the special sciences concern themselves with measurements of quite different
kinds of properties. Charge, mass, and momentum seem incidental to such
causal claims as ‘smoking causes cancer’, since the various sciences of cancer do
not concern themselves with charge, mass or momentum. This is the problem
of applicability.
Finally, there is the problem of absences. (See Lewis [2004].) We make
claims such as ‘I was late because my bus didn’t turn up’. But presumably
there can be no transmission of conserved quantities between an absent bus and
my lateness. Dowe has a response to this which I will discuss later.
Turning to newer theories, Glennan’s mechanistic theory of causality says: ‘a
relation between two events (other than fundamental physical events) is causal
when and only when these events are connected in the appropriate way by a
mechanism.’ [Glennan, 1996, p56].
One major problem for this theory is that when Glennan spells out what a
mechanism is, we can see that his theory is not really a new theory of causality.
If mechanisms are chains of laws Glennan [1996], invariance relations Glennan
[2002], or arrangements of singular determination relations Glennan [forthcom-
ing] - which are all familiar tools used in old theories of causality - then the
view merely adds some bells and whistles to existing theories. For the most
part, the bells and whistles have been added to old difference-making theories,
too. Glennan’s view clearly does better than Salmon-Dowe on applicability,
since mechanisms are ubiquitous in the special sciences, but he suggests that
his view does not apply to fundamental physics. It also has some counterexam-
ples in other domains. (See Illari and Williamson [forthcoming] for discussion.)
Finally, Glennan offers no explicit answer to the problem of absences.
The extra bells and whistles Glennan offers matter, and there may of course
be answers to offer to the old problems for production accounts. Indeed, the
account I offer in section 4 can be seen as an attempt to develop more carefully
the relation between causality and mechanisms.
The final view that I classify as a possible production account of causality is a
second popular form of pluralism about causality. Anscombe [1975] claims that
there are many thick causal concepts such as pushing, pulling, breaking, bind-
ing, and so on. Anscombe denies that there is anything in common to all such
thick causal concepts that we can identify as causality. Recent work by philoso-
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phers such as Cartwright [2004], working on capacities, and Machamer et al.
[2000], working on activities, explicitly agree. In so far as they see Anscombe’s
thick causal concepts as primitive connectives, they seem to hold some form
of production view of causality. They do go further than Anscombe, however,
in offering at least some second-order claims about capacities and activities,
respectively.
These views nicely embrace the full diversity of causal claims across domains
in the sciences, cheerfully covering everything. Nevertheless they are unsatis-
fying in denying that there is anything to be said about production in general
- or at least not very much. They also offer no explicit answers to the classic
problems for production - including absences. Presumbably we are to accept
‘breaking’ and ‘preventing’ - and any other causative verbs that might invoke ab-
sences - also as primitive causal connectives, about which we cannot say (much)
more. Again, the account I offer in section 4 can be seen as an attempt to keep
the general applicability of this account, but say something more about what
these thick causal concepts share.
This brief survey has drawn out the major problems for current production
accounts of causality, which will need to be addressed by any successful pro-
duction account: context, relevance, applicability and absences. Before going
on to tackle them, I will pause in the next section to consider what it is that a
production account is for. Should we try to retain a production account in the
face of these problems? What is it supposed to achieve? This will allow me to
probe more deeply into the problems, and identify which problems an account
of production should care about most.
3 What’s an account of production for?
In this section I will examine reasons for holding on to production intuitions,
disentangle the idea of a production account of causality from an account of
production tout court, and further clarify what the aim of my account will be. I
will contrast the job of production with the job of accounts of difference-making,
although I will not linger on these since my primary aim is to figure out the job
of production.
Production is a traditional element of our intuitions about causality. It is
a persistent and remarkably stable intuition. For example, in the Billy and
Suzy case above, where Billy’s stone breaks the bottle an instant before Suzy’s,
people are in remarkably stable agreement that Billy’s throw is clearly the cause,
even in the absence of dependence. (See Gopnik and Schulz [2007] for a useful
survey of some of the relevant literature in psychology.) But intuitions alone
are not enough. We can be mistaken even in our deepest intuitions, such as
the intuition that every event has a sufficient cause, that yielded in the end
to quantum mechanics. We need to have a reason to hold on to intutions, to
believe that they are guiding us right. Finding such good reason can also help
hone the correct content of an intuition, to make it more precise.
The non-applicability of existing substantive accounts of production, and
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the unsatisfying nature of the applicable accounts, might lead us to suppose
that we can safely just ignore production, at least in the special sciences. So the
important question is: are there reasons coming from the sciences to hold onto
an account of production? In this section I will argue that there is one primary
reason, and that careful examination of this reason usefully constrains what an
account of production should aim to do.
Many philosophers of science now think we use evidence of mechanisms in
causal inference at least sometimes. (See Illari [under review], Weber [2009],
Leuridan and Weber [forthcoming], Broadbent [forthcoming], Gillies [forthcom-
ing], Steel [2008], Kincaid [forthcoming]) If this is true, we are committed to
there being something in our accounts of causality that is at least consistent
with this, and if possible helps us understand it. There have been several possi-
ble roles for mechanisms suggested, including causal explanation (Vreese [2008],
Leuridan and Weber [forthcoming], Russo and Williamson [2007]); assessing the
stability of established causal claims (Leuridan and Weber [forthcoming]); as-
sisting with the problem of external validity, where you believe that C causes
E in a particular population, and you wish to claim that C also causes E in a
similar, but distinct, population (Leuridan and Weber [forthcoming], Russo and
Williamson [2007]); and linking mechanisms (Illari [under review], Russo and
Williamson [2007]).
These are all interesting ideas but I will focus on only one: the idea of
linking mechanisms. The idea is that finding mechanisms helps us in causal
inference by ruling in and ruling out possible causal links in a domain. This
source of evidence for and against causal claims can then be matched to the
difference-making relations we find - usually correlations. If nothing else, it
helps constrain the possible causal claims in domains where the causal structure
is underdetermined by difference-making relations alone.
It will help to examine this idea further with reference to some examples.
There are some important constraints that we routinely impose even on special
science mechanisms - so routinely that they are seldom mentioned explicitly.
Consider:
1. Causal influence cannot travel faster than the speed of light.
2. Energy constraints are important in biochemical mechanism discovery,
such as metabolic pathways.
The first is a deliverance of physics that we hardly ever consider. But it is
a powerful constraint on possible causes. If an event is not in the backwards
light-cone of E, it is just not a candidate possible cause of E. More prosaic
constraints are more regularly important. If a posited reaction in a biochemical
pathway requires more energy than is available, that mechanism is ruled out, or
an alternative source of energy sought.
Dependence accounts don’t explain these kinds of findings. There is nothing
in the idea of counterfactual dependence, or probabilistic relations, for example,
to yield these kinds of constraints. Counterfactual dependence and probabilistic
relations merely characterize a relationship between cause and effect, which may
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be significantly distant from each other in spacetime, and give no detail of any
link. So there is no way for such empirical constraints on how such a link can or
cannot be to impact on a difference-making theory. They have to be introduced
ad hoc, as add-ons.
But we need something that answers those constraints in our account of
causality, or there is nothing to explain some vital inferential practices. This is
the best argument for not giving up on the idea of causation having something
to do with linking or connection - in a way that can be constrained by empirical
findings.2 Note that I don’t think that any production account will address this
problem successfully. It is the primary aim of particular accounts of production
that they should do this well, and I will have this in mind when examining
information-transmission.
I have been writing in this section of an account of production, rather than
of a production account of causality. This is because I suggest we make a
distinction between:
1. A good production account of causality
2. A good account of production
As a way to make progress, I will consider only how to formulate an account
of production. By making this switch away from giving a full-blown account of
causality, I don’t have to deal with the counterexamples coming from difference-
making theories. I am only interested in a good account of production, which
is an account that does well the particular job of an account of production, and
may not do well on the jobs that fall to difference-making accounts.
• Jobs for accounts of difference-making:
Context
Relevance
Recall that these are the first two well-known problems for the Salmon-Dowe
production account of causality that I discussed in section 2. But these are not
problems for an account of production that does not claim to be a univocal ac-
count of causality. These are the jobs that difference-making accounts do well.
Relevant properties of the cause are very much difference-making properties, on
which features of the effect depend, as distinct from the properties that make
no difference. Changing the colours of interacting billiard balls does not make a
difference to their movement - their movement does not counterfactually depend
on, is not probabilistically affected by, their colour, for example. Counterfactual,
2Other elements of production have been discussed by various philosophers. For Hall
[2004], the core of production is transitivity, locality and intrinsicness. Many philosophers
seek the Humean secret connexion: oomph, biff or glue. We might add singularism, as a core
concern of Glennan’s, although some difference-making accounts are also singularist, such as
counterfactual dependence. Others are concerned with realism - production as the thing in
the world Dowe [2004]. I suggest we let the needs of causal inference guide us in forming an
account of production, and see whether any of these traditional elements of production are
satisfied afterwards. I will not address them further in this paper.
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probabilistic, invariance and causal modelling theories will all characterize this
very nicely. Context is also a matter of difference-making. That context might
alter which properties are difference-makers is no problem for difference-making
theories. That patterns of counterfactual dependence or probability distribu-
tion between C and E might change with context introduces no metaphysical
paradox. Woodward [2003] includes the place of context explicitly in the choice
of variables. Difference-making theories do these jobs well.
Further, these jobs are not important to an account of production. This is
because they have nothing to do with the mere possibility or impossibility of a
link existing between cause and effect. But linking is what accounts of produc-
tion are about. So I will leave these problems for difference-making accounts to
solve, and move to consider the real problems for accounts of production.
• Remaining worries for accounts of production:
Applicability without disunity
Absences
These are the remaining two well-known problems for the Salmon-Dowe account
that I discussed in section 2. But with the primary purpose of an account of
production firmly in mind, we can see that these are serious problems. They
cannot be sidestepped. To hold that production is applicable only in funda-
mental physics is unacceptably reductive, and means that standard constraints
on causal inference cannot be applied the way they routinely are in the special
sciences. The real problem of absences for production is also now revealed. If
production is about a possible link between a postulated cause and an effect of
interest, a gap between cause and effect ought to rule out a link, and so rule
out any such cause-effect relationship. Unlike relevance and context, if these
problems cannot be solved, no satisfactory account of production is available. I
will further refine the problem of absences in section 5.
Once we consider the literature in this way, we can see that we have many
good accounts of difference-making. They give no account of linking, but they
deal well with relevance and context. We understand them well, including hav-
ing a reasonably precise statement of their strengths and weaknesses. But we
are still in need of a widely-applicable good account of production. To reiterate,
seeking such an account is also an excellent way of rigorously examining the pro-
duction intuition itself, disentangling it from difference-making intutions, and
seeing whether it can truly stand on its own. Ultimately a better understanding
of production itself might either lead us back to a univocal account of causality,
or establish pluralism convincingly.
Even with the aim narrowed - to give an account of production rather than
of causality in general - and the job of production more clearly delimited as
concerning linking, it is worth pausing to consider, finally, what an account of
production - a philosophical account - might offer.
Dowe [2004] distinguishes between a conceptual and an empirical account of
causality. The aim of a conceptual account is to tidy up our concept of causality,
which exists in thought or language, or both. The aim of an empirical account
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is to say what causality is, in the world. Dowe is right to raise the issue. But I
do not think the two projects can succeed apart. My aim is to say what’s in the
world such that our concept of production tracks something, at least reasonably
successfully. This is an empirically-motivated way of developing a concept.
The account I offer might be reductive. But I am not interested in elimi-
nating causal talk, so this is not my primary aim. What’s most interesting to
me is the generality of the account. I am seeking to say what it is that is in
the world, that is present most generally in cases of productive causes. I hope
the resulting general account will be fruitful in theorizing and in methodological
practice. If we can see what productive causes have in common, this will deepen
our understanding of them, and also contribute to deepening our understanding
of their use in causal inference. A background of unity also gives a nice counter-
foil to understanding the plurality of productive causes undoubtedly described
in various scientific fields. I will expand on this in subsection 4.3.
4 An information-transmission account of pro-
duction
4.1 The applicability problem
The work of the previous sections has established that I should look for an
account of production appropriate to the use of linking mechanisms to rule in
and rule out possible causes in causal inference. I want an account that is as
general as possible, widely applicable across the sciences, so allowing it to be
illuminating about our inferential practices. Finally, I am looking for a solution
to the problem of absences. In this section I am going to argue (in subsection
4.1) that the applicability problem suggests a move towards seeing production
in terms of information-transmission, explain (in subsection 4.2) Collier’s ac-
count of causality as information-transmission, and offer (in subsection 4.3) a
development of Collier’s account. I will move on, in section 5, to a solution to
the abiding problem of absences.
Recall that Anscombe [1975] argues that there is no univocal conception of
cause available. The mechanisms literature has taken this point on board and
Machamer et al. [2000], while making some second-order claims, talk of diverse
activities, which do indeed seem to be common in the language of mechanisms
of the special sciences: binding, breaking, metabolising, unfurling, pushing,
pulling, and so on. Descriptively, Anscombe is clearly right that these activities
are ubiquitous in the special sciences, and that they are diverse. (See Illari
and Williamson [under review] for further discussion.) We have come from
the problem of Hall-pluralism about causality to the challenge of another form
of pluralism - the diversity of thick causal concepts. It is right to look to the
sciences to tell us about what constitutes linking or connection. The constraints
we use to guide our causal inferences in the ways I have described are not
conceptual constraints, but empirical ones. Perhaps the sciences themselves tell
us that there is nothing much more general that can be said than: we find out
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about possible causal links - the thick causal concepts, or primitive connectives
- which are different in different domains.
Where should we look in the quest to find anything that is more unifying
than Anscombe’s view, more widely applicable than Salmon-Dowe’s view, and
a more substantial than Glennan’s view? It is true, as Glennan notes, that
many sciences talk about mechanisms, but I have explained why their relation
to causality is not so simple to spell out as Glennan claims. Something else
we find in the sciences is lots of people talking about information - right across
different scientific disciplines.
4.2 Collier’s Information-transmission theory
In view of this, it is not surprising that a few philosophers are also beginning
to develop thinking on causality and its relation to information. Interestingly,
two brands of structural realism have moved towards a view they both describe
as ‘information-theoretic structural realism’ (Ladyman and Ross [2007], and
Floridi [2008]). Crudely, these views claim that the only fundamental thing
there is is information, which seems to imply that if causality is anything, it
is information transfer. [Ladyman and Ross, 2007, p210-1] explicitly recognize
this: the ‘special sciences are incorrigibly committed to dynamic propagation of
temporally asymmetric influences ... . Reference to transfer of some (in princi-
ple) quantitatively measurable information is a highly general way of describing
any process. More specifically, ... if there are causal processes, then each such
process must involve the transfer of information between cause and effect’. In
an apparently unrelated piece, Machamer and Bogen [forthcoming] offer the
only attempt I know of to explain the relation of information to mechanistic
hierarchy. I will return to this point in subsection 4.3.
This literature is small, but complex and highly technical, so I lack space
to survey it all. In this paper, I will concentrate on John Collier’s work in
Collier [In press] and Collier [1999]. This is the earliest claim that causality
is information-transfer, which influenced Ladyman and Ross. It also has the
advantage of being a theory of causality, without the surrounding complexities
of structural realism and mechanisms.
In Collier’s own words: ‘The basic idea is that causation is the transfer of
a particular token of a quantity of information from one state of a system to
another.’ [Collier, 1999, p215.] He fills this out by offering an account of what
information is - including what the particular case of physical information is -
and an account of information transfer. I will explain these in turn.
For Collier, the information in a thing - in the first instance, in a static thing
- is formally, and objectively, defined in terms of computational information
theory:
In the static case, the information in an object or property can be
derived by asking a set of canonical questions that classify the object
uniquely ... with yes or no answers, giving a 1-1 mapping from the
questions and object to the answers. This gives a string of 1s and
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0s ... . There are standard methods to compress these strings ... .
The compressed form is a line in a truth table, and is a generator
of everything true of the thing required to classify it. There need
not be a unique shortest string, but the set will be a linear space of
logically equivalent propositions. The dimensionality of this space is
the amount of information in the original object. [Collier, In press,
p2.]
This definition is very widely applicable. It is important that it is quite
independent of human minds, and so applies easily to the physical world, as
well as to the special sciences. Indeed, ideas of information are being extensively
developed in physics.
Physical information is a special case of the more general definition of in-
formation. To get physical information, Collier adds two further constraints.
The first is that physical information in a system breaks down into what Collier
calls ‘intropy’, which is broadly free energy, and ‘enformation’, which is broadly
structural constraints. For example: ‘A steam engine has an intropy determined
by the thermodynamic potential generated in its steam generator, due to the
temperature and pressure differences between the generator and the condenser.
... The enformation of the engine is its structural design, which guides the
steam and the piston the steam pushes to do work. The design confines the
steam in a regular way over time and place.’ [Collier, 1999, p228.] The second
constraint is the Negentropy Principle of Information (NPI), which is an inter-
pretative heuristic that allows Collier to connect information theory to physical
causation via physical entropy - which is clearly a physical item. [Collier, 1999,
p226ff.] discusses the details, but these are not crucial for understanding Col-
lier’s claim.
This yields: ‘The resulting notion of causal process is: P is a physical causal
process in system over a series of states Si from time t0 to t1 if and only if
some part of the enformation is transferred from t0 to t1, consistent with NPI’.
[Collier, In press, p10.] Recall that this account is of the static case. What
Collier’s definition means is that the steam engine is a physical causal process
in so far as some part of its structural design is maintained through time. It is
this structural design which allows intropy to do work. Returning to Salmon’s
example of the remote control for opening the garage door, there is a physical
causal process in this sense if the form of the remote, and the receiver, and the
garage door mechanism, is maintained through time.
The static case above helps introduce the basics of causality as information,
but the full theory requires attention to what happens in the dynamical case -
when information is not only present, but flows. Indeed, what happens when
information flows is vital to my aim of understanding causality as connection,
and the kinds of constraints this imposes on possible causes, such as that causal
influence cannot propagate faster than the speed of light. Illuminating such
constraints is what I take to be the primary aim of an account of production.
In Collier’s early paper, information-flow is defined very simply, in terms of
identity: ‘P is a causal process in system S from time t0 to t1 iff some particular
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part of the information of S involved in stages of P is identical at t0 and t1.’
[Collier, 1999, p222.] Collier [In press] uses the theory of information flow of
Barwise and Seligman [1997] to fill this out considerably in terms of information
channels: ‘An information channel for a distributed system is an indexed family
of infomorphisms with a common core codomain C. The infomorphisms allow
information to be carried from one part of the system to another. For example,
in a flashlight, the components might be a bulb, battery, switch and case. The
channel is basically a connected series of infomorphisms from switch to bulb
through the mediation of battery and case.’ [Collier, In press, p6.] ‘Infomor-
phism’ means something like the following: Consider two systems IS1 and IS2.
Each system consists of a set of objects, and each object has a set of attributes.
For example, an object might be a switch, and its possible attributes would be
on or off. The “state” of a system means the attributes of all its objects. If,
by knowing the state of IS1 you can always tell the state of IS2, then you have
an infomorphism. Note that knowing the state of IS1 will not always tell you
everything about the state of IS2 - some information might be lost. The rules
(or functions) that let you infer the state of one system from the state of the
other is what defines the infomorphism.
Collier’s final view is:
P is a causal connection in a system from time t0 to t1 if and only
if there is an channel between s0 and s1 from t0 to t1 that preserves
some part of the information in the first state. Furthermore, P is a
physical causal process in system over a series of states si from time
t0 to t1 if and only there is a channel through the states from t0 to
t1, consistent with NPI, and over every intermediate state. [Collier,
In press, p10-1, emphasis added.]
Note that Collier here offers an account both of causal connection, and of a
physical causal process, and there is no longer a distinction between intropy
and enformation. To illustrate, consider again Salmon’s electronic door opener.
This is an information channel, through which we can trace infomorphisms from
the button, through the signal, to the door opening mechanism.
For Collier, the causal connection in the most recent theory is still fundamen-
tally identity, and information flow is given in terms of identity of information at
various stages in an information channel. He writes: ‘the connection in this case
is identity, which is perhaps the strongest connection one can have, and requires
information transmission across time: it is the identical token of information.’
[Collier, In press, p11-2.] Notice finally that Collier adds the intermediate state
constraint on physical causal processes. He says explicitly that this may be
unnecessary at [Collier, 1999, p230]. I will return to this point in section 5.
Collier’s theory is very general, both in domain of application and in its
relation to other theories of causality. Collier suggests that his theory: ‘applies
to all forms of causation, but requires a specific interpretation of information for
each category of substance (assuming there is more than one).’ [Collier, 1999,
p215-6.] I will return to this idea shortly. Collier also claims: ‘my approach
can be interpreted as a version of each of the others [standard approaches to
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causality] with suitable additional assumptions.’ [Collier, 1999, p235.]3 As
far as other production theories go, Collier claims that his theory entails the
conserved quantities view in that domain. It can also be seen as an extension of
the mark-transmission view. But Collier’s view avoids the problem that some
causal processes cannot be marked, if we take the form of the states of a physical
process to itself be a mark. They all have form anyway, so such a ‘mark’ doesn’t
need to be introduced. This also removes the need for counterfactuals in giving
the theory. [Collier, 1999, p229.]
4.3 Mechanisms as Information-channels
I have argued for the advantages of Collier’s theory as a widely applicable ac-
count of production that offers a view of causal connection and the flow of
causal influence. These are advantages he does not himself stress, and I have
strengthened them by explaining their value in the current debate over pro-
duction versus difference-making accounts. Nevertheless, there are other clear
advantages of the theory that Collier does advertise, in particular that other
theories of causality come out as special cases of his more general view.
In view of these advantages, it is surprising that Collier’s theory has not been
more carefully examined. I suspect the technical difficulty of understanding it
has contributed to this, as has the challenge of drawing out the implications of
the theory for the current concerns of the causality literature. I hope my work
has helped to draw out some of these implications.
In this subsection, I will now attempt to link Collier’s theory even more
intimately to existing views of production, specifically those of Glennan, and the
Anscombe-inspired primitivists. I will do this by suggesting that information-
transmission as an account of production should be linked to mechanisms. I
will argue that the theory solves the problem of absences in section 5.4
[Machamer et al., 2000, p7] make an interesting complaint against Salmon’s
theory: ‘Although we acknowledge the possibility that Salmon’s analysis may
be all there is to certain fundamental types of interactions in physics, his analy-
sis is silent as to the character of the productivity in the activities investigated
by many other sciences. Mere talk of transmission of a mark or exchange of a
conserved quantity does not exhaust what these scientists know about produc-
tive activities and about how activities effect regular changes in mechanisms.’
This complaint might be extended to information-transmission. It apparently
identifies an analogous lack in the theory.
But this lack can be addressed by looking to mechanisms, and there are
resources in Collier’s theory that invite this extension. Collier notes that on
his account information-transmission is relative to a channel of information:
‘For example, what you consider noise on your TV might be a signal to a
TV repairman. Notice that this does not imply a relativity of information to
3This suggests a univocal account of causality. As I have said, I am here interested only in
an account of production, and will reserve for further work the examination of whether this
account can be extended to do the jobs of difference-making accounts.
4These are developments that Collier is highly sympathetic to (private communication).
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interests, but that interests can lead to paying attention to different channels.
The information in the respective channels is objective in each case, the noise
relative to the non-functioning or poorly functioning television channel, and
the noise as a product of a noise producing channel - the problem for the TV
repairman is to diagnose the source of the noise via its channel properties.’
[Collier, In press, p8.] By seeing mechanisms as information channels, we can
relate Collier’s theory to Glennan’s, to Anscombe’s, and to the rapidly-growing
literature on causal explanation and causal inference using mechanisms in the
special sciences.
It is well known that mechanisms are relative to the phenomenon they ex-
plain. (See Bechtel [2008], Darden [2006], Illari and Williamson [2010].) In
mechanistic explanation, the phenomenon is explained by decomposing it into
lower-level entities and activities (or Glennan’s parts and interactions), which
in turn may be further decomposed into yet lower-level entities and activities,
creating a functional hierarchy of nested mechanisms with the original phe-
nomenon at the top. When Collier says the regularities of a distributed system
are relative to its analysis in terms of information-channels, this can easily be
read as a claim about the functional hierarchy of mechanisms. The functional
hierarchy gives you the infomorphisms, rendering a mechanism an information
channel. The work of Machamer and Bogen [forthcoming], relating mechanistic
hierarchy to causal continuity, is of course immensely interesting, but Collier’s
view is far more general. Machamer and Bogen’s account will only capture one
kind of mechanistic information.
So Collier’s work can be seen to be directly related to Glennan’s, and an ex-
planation of how production is related to mechanisms. In so far as the activities
in mechanisms are all Anscombe-style causative connectives, as MDC explicitly
claim, they should come out as connections in the information-channel, thus
relating Collier’s work to the Anscombe tradition. Collier gives us what is gen-
erally true of all cases of causative connection: they are all cases of information
transfer.
And this is the point at which the domain-specific empirical work is con-
nected to Collier’s theory. What kinds of connections exist in each domain is
discovered empirically, to yield the greater informativeness that MDC claimed
was lacking in the conserved quantities account. Unlike the conserved quanti-
ties theory, information-transmission admits of modes. Different scientific fields
can be taken as studying different modes of information-transmission, and em-
pirically discovering what constraints on information-transmission exist in their
particular domain. Machamer and Bogen’s information will plausibly come out
as a special case.5 Thus the information-transmission account naturally illumi-
nates our successful causal inferential practices.
So my view is that causality is information-transmission across a mechanis-
tic hierarchy. Note that a mechanistic hierarchy might only be relevant to the
5I have given a unified account of production in terms of information. If the notion of
information splinters, I will lose the unity I set out to achieve. I intend to address this
by using work by Floridi that multiple notions of information are related, with some more
fundamental than others. See Floridi [2010], Floridi [2009]. I reserve this for future work.
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special sciences. The difference for physics - or perhaps merely for fundamen-
tal physics - might be dropping that bit of essential context. The mechanism
gives you the thing in the world that holds together disparate causal relevance
conditions. It is what we call the information channels we use to track causal
connections, and constraints on causal connections, in building up our picture
of the causal structure of our world.6
5 Absences
Finally, information-transmission also offers a novel solution to the problem of
absences. It does this by giving a new view of connection that is appropriate
to the special sciences, rather than one that is reductive in the way of Salmon-
Dowe processes. The old problem of absences goes with the old reductive view
of connection that we have discovered is not always appropriate to the special
sciences.
I will begin by further refining the problem of absences for an account of pro-
duction. Dowe [2001] gives a counterfactual account of quasi-causation, holding
that causation of or by an absence is not full-blown causation. It is certainly
tempting to write off causal claims citing absences as non-standard, merely anal-
ogous ‘quausal’ claims. The problem with this is that absences as causes, or
indeed effects, are ubiquitous in causal discourse and scientific theorizing. They
can’t be ignored or got rid of by an ad hoc add-on to a theory.
In an influential paper, Schaffer discusses the example of a gunshot through
the heart causing death: ‘But heart damage only causes death by negative cau-
sation: heart damage (c) causes an absence of oxygenated blood flow to the
brain (vd), which causes the cells to starve (e).’ Later he considers the gun:
‘But trigger pullings only cause bullet firings by negative causation: pulling the
trigger (c) causes the removal of the sear from the path of the spring (vd), which
causes the spring to uncoil, thereby compressing the gunpowder and causing an
explosion, which causes the bullet to fire (e).’ [Schaffer, 2004, p199.] In that
paper, Schaffer says that psychologists, biologists, chemists and physicists all
routinely invoke negative causation. This is absolutely right. Taking just bio-
chemistry, examples are numerous. Cells routinely alter which enzymes they
produce in response to which metabolites are available. A cell stops producing
lactase, for example, in response to the absence of lactose diffusing into the
cells cytoplasm. Consider [Adams et al., 1992, p577]: ‘Phosphorylation of only
6There is an interesting possibility that this view will offer a univocal account of causality.
Information-transmission deals well with production, and mechanistic hierarchy offers the
possibility of solving the problems of context and relevance. It is well known that mechanisms
set the context for causal claims. They also point you to the relevant properties - properties
that make a difference to various effects of interest. If accounts of these can be given in
informational terms, this will yield a univocal account of causality. If accounts of these
require extra work, brought in from the mechanisms literature, that cannot be incorporated
in the informational account, then the resulting account will still show how production and
difference-making integrate, while remaining conceptually distinct. Either way, the view will
be fruitful. I reserve this possibility for future work.
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approximately 20% of eIF-2 can cause complete inhibition of initiation because
there are only 20-25% as many molecules of eIF-2B as eIF-2.’ Finally, absences
are also very common parts of mechanisms, as Craver notes: ‘Absences do not
bear or exchange conserved quantities. They are not processes, they are not
“things”, properly speaking, and they do not exhibit consistency of characteris-
tics over time. Nonetheless, the absence of the Mg2+ block does seem to cause
Ca2+ to enter the cell. At least, this is what controlled experiments suggest:
when the Mg2+ block is in place, the Ca2+ does not enter the cell. When the
Mg2+ block is removed, the Ca2+ current begins to flow.’ [Craver, 2007, p80].
These are all serious impediments to explaining away absence-causation by a
maneouvre such as Dowe’s. An account of production must engage with the
problem of absences directly.
The first thing to notice is that there is not one, but two, problems of
absences.
1. Metaphysics of absence
2. A particular problem for production accounts (that difference-making ac-
counts do not share [Schaffer, 2004, p294.])
Notice that nobody has a solution to the first problem. The metaphysical prob-
lem of what to say is the truthmaker for absence claims is not a problem specific
to accounts of production. It is not even limited to accounts of causation, but
is a general metaphysical problem. I need to focus on what the problem is that
production accounts are supposed to have with absences that difference-making
accounts do not have. I will use the discussion of section 3 above to significantly
clarify what the problem of absences really is for an account of production.
Notice that one aspect of the uses of absences in scientific discourse is about
identifying a property that is highly relevant to an effect, and pointing out what
happens when it is not there. Since oxygen is necessary for human life, its ab-
sence is highly relevant to the non-continuance of life. Further, this often occurs
against a context - of factors usually present, or usually absent. Mechanisms
often set this context. These, however, are difference-making issues. These are
the things that accounts of difference-making do well, and that a mechanistic
hierarchy can help with. I will set them aside as not a concern of an account of
production.
A serious issue of absences remains. The serious issue is that citing an
absence, by introducing a gap between C and E, seems to rule out the possibility
of a link between C and E. The solution to this problem lies in the way the
idea of information can modify what we think of as a gap.
Information can be transmitted across what are traditionally regarded as
physical gaps or disconnections. For example, if Billy says to Suzy that he’ll
meet her for lunch at 2pm, unless he phones her by noon to cancel, the absence
of a phone call by noon tells Suzy to go and meet Billy at 2pm. Information
channels can also involve absences. A binary string is just a series of 1s and 0s,
which can also be a string of positive signals, and absences of a positive signal.
For Floridi, this is the essential core of data - most fundamentally, a datum is
16
just a difference. He writes: ‘The fact is that a genuine, complete erasure of all
data can be achieved only by the elimination of all possible differences. This
clarifies why a datum is ultimately reducible to a lack of uniformity.’ [Floridi,
2010, p21.] This shows that what you think is a gap depends what you think
the gap is a gap in.
If you’re looking for gaps in information-transmission, you’re looking for
something different than when you look for gaps in continuous space-time. Many
‘gaps’ in continuous space-time will disappear against the different background
of information. [Floridi, 2010, p31] notices this: ‘This is a peculiarity of infor-
mation: its absence may also be informative.’ Schaffer [2004] says causation by
absences shows that causation does not involve a persisting line, or a physical
connection. I am arguing that what the problem of absences shows is that our
conception of connection is wrong. We have not updated it for the diversity
of causal connections the sciences are telling us exist in the special sciences.
This outdated intuition is, I think, the correct explanation for the ‘intuition of
difference’ discussed by Dowe [2001].
This is why it is important that Collier has to add locality constraints to
his account of physical causation. They are not contained in the account al-
ready. [Collier, 1999, p223-4] notes: ‘Locality, both spatial and temporal, is
a common constraint on causation. Hume’s “constant conjunction” is usually
interpreted this way. While it is unclear how causation could be propagated
nonlocally, some recent approaches to the interpretation of quantum mechanics
(e.g. Bohm, 1980) permit something like nonlocal causation by allowing the
same information (in Bohm’s case “the implicate order”) to appear in spatially
disparate places with no spatially continuous connection. Temporally nonlocal
causation is even more difficult to understand, but following its suggestion to
me (by C.B. Martin) I have been able to see no way to rule it out. Like spa-
tially nonlocal causation, temporally nonlocal causation is possible only if the
same information is transferred from one time to another without the informa-
tion existing at all times in between. Any problems in applying this idea are
purely epistemological: we need to know it is the same information, and not
an independent chance or otherwise determined convergence. Resolving these
problems, however, requires an appropriate notion of information and identity
for the appropriate metaphysical category.’
So ultimately it is a virtue of the information-transmission view that it allows
the kinds of connections that exist in different domains to be an empirical issue,
not an a priori one. It allows that space-time gaps are possible, if the identical
bit of information can be transmitted across a spacetime gap. For different
information channels - different mechanisms - we will have to discover what
they do and don’t permit in terms of connection. This will be what constitutes
identity of information in that information channel. This has completely altered
the traditional problem of absences by changing the very idea of what constitutes
a connection, or its correlate, a gap. In conjunction with the place of difference-
making as what selects relevant properties, which are sometimes absences, this
solves the traditional problem of absences.
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6 Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued for a view of production as information-transmission
across a mechanistic hierarchy, drawing on the existing theory of John Collier.
This offers an account of production that is widely applicable across the sciences,
and solves the traditional problem of absences in an entirely novel way. I have
investigated the primary aim of an account of production, arguing that it is to
help us better understand our use of linking or connection in causal inference,
and how the results of our empirical studies delimit linking or connection. The
view of production as information-transmission satisfies this by allowing for dif-
ferent modes of information-transmission to be discovered in different scientific
domains.
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